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RAPE REFORM AND A STATUTORY
CONSENT DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past three hundred years, rape has been defined as sexual
intercourse by force and against the victim's will. I The essential element
distinguishing rape from non-criminal sexual intercourse was the vic-
tim's lack of consent.2 In order to convict a defendant of rape, the pros-
ecution has been required to prove the subjective element of lack of
consent through a number of "objective" criteria, including proof that
the victim resisted the assailant to the "utmost,"'3 that the victim cried
out while being attacked,4  that the victim filed a complaint
"promptly,"'5 and that her testimony has been corroborated. 6 The re-
quirement of such objective criteria has undoubtedly contributed to the
fact that most rapes are never reported to the police, and that, of those
1 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1981) ("A male person of the age of 14 years
and upwards who has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, by force and against her
will, commits rape"); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
Rape reform laws in many states have made the crime gender neutral and expanded the
definition to include anal and oral intercourse, as well as penetration by an object, and have
changed the name to "sexual assault" or "criminal sexual conduct." See infra note 14. For
purposes of historical clarity and consistency in this Comment, the term "rape" will be used
here to denote the traditional definition of the crime, and the term "sexual assault" or "sexual
conduct" will be used to denote the broader, reform definitions and to refer to specific statutes
using those terms. This Comment will not discuss issues involving child sexual assault or the
sexual assault of the mentally ill or incapacitated, since the non-consent of the victim is not a
factor in these cases.
2 In People v. Fryman, 4 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 122 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1954), the Illinois
Supreme Court stated: "Want of consent on the part of the prosecutrix is of the essence of the
crime of forcible rape. .. "
3 One court has held that a "mere tactical surrender in the face of an assumed superior
force is not enough. Where the penalty for the defendant may be supreme, so must resistance
be unto the uttermost." Moss v. State, 208 Miss. 531, 536, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (1950); see also
State v. Cowing, 99 Minn. 123, 108 N.W. 851 (1906); Prokop v. State, 148 Neb. 582, 28
N.W.2d 200 (1947).
4 "Failure on the part of the woman to cry out when she is being attacked tends to show
consent." Note, Consent as a Defense to Crimes Against the Person, 54 DICK. L. REv. 186, 189
(1950); see also, People v. Morrow, 132 Ill. App. 2d 293, 270 N.E.2d 487 (1971).
5 The Colorado Supreme Court has stated: "Evidence of the failure of the person as-
saulted to make complaint soon after the commission of the outrage is a circumstance which
tends to discredit her testimony." Padilla v. People, 156 Colo. 186, 188, 397 P.2d 741, 743
(1964).
6 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 and practice commentary (McKinney 1975).
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that are, only two percent result in convictions. 7
Misconceptions about the crime of rape and mistrust of the female
accuser led to the development of this "peculiar" body of law.8 Consent
has been the essential element of the crime because rape has been
thought to be the same act as consensual sexual intercourse, except that
one of the participants does not consent. The accusations of female
complainants, however, have not been trusted. Courts and legal schol-
ars have long held the belief that most women lie about their lack of
consent in such situations, because they either desire forceful inter-
course, imagine that a rape occurred, or use such accusations for revenge
or blackmail.9
During the last twenty years, however, scientific studies on rape
and the growth of the women's movement have dispelled these miscon-
ceptions, and led to efforts to reform the definition of rape. In light of
recent psychological and sociological research characterizing rape as pri-
marily a crime of violence rather than a crime of sex,10 some reformers
have eliminated the consent element and defined rape solely in terms of
the force or violence used by the assailant.I I Other reformers argue that
a woman's right to privacy and to say no to sexual advances should be
protected, and thus a new definition of lack of consent should be made a
part of the definition of rape. 12 Many states continue to use the tradi-
tional definition of non-consent, although the statutory language may
have been updated. 13 These changes have taken place as states across
the country have completely rewritten the evidentiary, sentencing, and
definitional laws concerning rape.14 The definition of lack of consent,
7 A number of studies indicate that only one rape out of every four committed is re-
ported; other studies estimate that only one rape out of every ten committed is reported. See
BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE LAW AND JusTICE STUDY CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSIST-
ANCE ADMINISTRATION, FORCIBLE RAPE: FINAL REPORT 15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
BATTELLE INSTITUTE REPORT, FINAL REPORT]; Rape: The Sexual Weapon, Time Magazine,
September 5, 1983, at 27. The Battelle Institute Report also noted that fear of police, prose-
cutors, and trial procedures were the leading reasons why rape victims did not report the
crime. BATTELLE INSTITUTE REPORT, FINAL REPORT, supra, at 15.
8 Berger concludes that "[t]he 'peculiar' law of rape has produced evidentiary oddities
that have marked it out for criticism and change." Berger, Man'r Tial, Woman's Tribulation:
Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7 (1977). Berger also observes that this
singularity "stems mainly from a deep distrust of the woman accuser." Id. at 10.
9 For an extensive discussion of the reasons why the accusations of female complainants
could not be trusted, see Note, Forcible Rape and Statuto Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE LJ. 55 (1952).
10 See in/ra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
13 See in/ra notes 64-69 and 86-91 and accompanying text.
14 Since 1969, every state in the country has made some change in their rape or sexual
assault statute. See Bienen, Rape IV, supplement to 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. (1980) (coin-
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however, continues to be "the single most unresolved issue in the area of
rape reform."' 5
This Comment will examine rape and the consent issue. The Com-
ment begins by reviewing the common law origins of the definition of
rape and consent, and surveys the reform statutes which have attempted
to formulate a new definition of the crime. The last section of the Com-
ment analyzes a new rape statute, recently enacted in Illinois. The stat-
ute defines rape solely in terms of the force used by the assailant and
creates an affirmative defense of consent. This formulation may finally
address the concerns of rape reformers and dispel the misconceptions
and mistrust underlying the traditional law of rape.
II. CONSENT AND THE COMMON LAW
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE LAW
Rape statutes date back to the earliest codifications of ancient
law.16 The key element in the definitions of these ancient crimes was the
plete survey of all state rape laws as of 1980) [hereinafter cited as Bienen, Rape ZVJ. Three
jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, made changes only in the penalties levied or
evidentiary requirements, but did not change the basic definition of the crime. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3502 (1981).
Many of the reform statutes have been drafted by victims or victim-advocate groups, and
are aimed at eliminating those elements of the law most offensive and detrimental to victims
of rape. See Bienen, Rape Ill-National Developments in Rape Reform Legisrlation, 6 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. RPTR. 170, 171-72 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bienen, Rape III]; BATTELLE MEMO-
RIAL INSTITUTE LAW AND JUSTICE STUDY CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRA-
TION, FORCIBLE RAPE: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 46-47 [hereinafter cited as BATTELLE
INSTITUTE REPORT, FORCIBLE RAPE: LEGAL ISSUES]. For example, 44 states have enacted
evidentiary laws that limit the admissibility of a victim's sexual history or reputation at trial.
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (Supp.
1982); cf. FED. R. EVID. 412. Thirty-eight states have created penalty structures with differ-
ent degrees of rape based on the dangerousness of the offender or the vulnerability of the
victim. See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402-403 (1978); MICH. COMe. LAws ANN.
§§ 750.520(b), (d)(Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (1981). Forty-one states have
made their rape statutes gender neutral, and most of these states have also expanded the
definition of the crime to include vaginal, oral, and anal penetration by objects as well as by a
penis. Because some states have felt that a broader definition of the crime warranted a
broader name for the crime, 21 reform statutes have changed the title of the crime from
"rape" to "sexual assault" or a similar term. See e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 14-2 (West
1982) ("sexual assault"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976) ("sexual battery'); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West Supp. 1982) ("criminal sexual conduct"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-11 (Supp. 1982) ("criminal sexual penetration"). A number of other statutes also
deal with "sexual contact" crimes that involve touching of the breast or genitalia, but not
penetration. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.5201a, c, e (West Supp. 1982).
15 Bienen, Rape III, supra note 14, at 181; see also Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform
Rape Statutes on Prosecution.- An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REV. 543, 548 (1980) ("[T]he
definitional standard is the most important conceptual issue in rape law . . ").
16 The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, dating from approximately 1900 B.C., defined a
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marital status of the woman. The most serious punishment for rape was
levied when the victim was a virgin betrothed to another man because
the valuable possession of that man was forever destroyed. 17 In contrast,
rape of a virgin who was not betrothed was treated as a minor offense,
punished by an order to marry the woman and a fine to be paid to the
victim's father.'8
The classic definition of rape was formulated by Lord Edward
Coke in 1628, and is the basis for modern-day rape laws: "Rape. . . is
when a man hath carnall [sic] knowledge of a woman by force and
against her will."'19 Matthew Hale defined the crime in similar terms, as
"the carnal knowledge of any woman above the age of ten years with or
against her will," 20 omitting the force element.2 ' This discrepancy does
not seem to have been significant, as the key element in the definition
was lack of consent. Force was only relevant as a means of showing non-
consent.
22
series of crimes involving "lying" with women who were betrothed or married to others. Gold
& Wyatt, The Rape System: Old Roles and New Tmes, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 695, 696-98 (1978).
One thousand years later, a similar series of laws appeared in the Book of Deuteronomy, the
compilation of ancient Hebrew law. See Deuteronomy 22:28-29; Smith, Histo,7 ofRape and Rape
Laws, 60 WOMEN LAWYERS J. 188, 189 (1974).
17 The punishment exacted was death by stoning. If the crime took place outside the city,
in the deserted field, only the assailant was punished. If, however, the crime took place within
the city wall, both victim and attacker were stoned, since it was believed that a truly virtuous
woman would have cried out and been saved from an attack occurring in the city. S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 10- 11 (1975); Smith, supra
note 16, at 189.
18 Gold & Wyatt, supra note 16, at 699; Smith, supra note 16, at 189. This historical legacy
has led many modem feminist commentators to find that "[t]he crime of rape is. . . consid-
ered an offense not against the woman herself, but against the men who made the law, fa-
thers, husbands and kin." Greer, Seduction is a Four-Letter Word, in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 374,
378 (L. Schultz ed. 1975); see also, BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 8 ("Rape entered the law
through the back door, as it were, as a property crime of man against man. Woman, of
course, was viewed as the property."); Griffin, Rape.- The All-American Cime, in FORCIBLE
RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM AND THE OFFENDER 47, 61 (D. Chappell, R. Geis & G. Geis
eds. 1977) ("Laws against rape exist to protect the rights of male as possessor of the female
body and not the right of the female over her own body.").
19 1 E. COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 190, at
*124a; Vf. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (Supp. 1982) ("A person commits rape when he has
carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will").
20 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628. The differentiation
between the rape of adults and the rape of children is also maintained in all modern rape
laws. The age of consent varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it is generally true that
sexual penetration of children is a crime, whether consensual or not. See Bienen, Rape III,
supra note 14, at 189-97.
21 See Gold & Wyatt, supra note 16, at 699-700; Snelling, What ir Rape?, in RAPE VIC-
TIMOLOGY 145, 146-47 (L. Schultz ed. 1975).
22 One commentator explains: "Rather than seeing the nonconsensual conduct of the
victim as relevant to show that the actor must have used force, the carnal knowledge statute
sees force only as relevant to show nonconsent." Note, Recent Statuto.7 Developments in the Defini-
tion of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1504 (1975). Blackstone credited English law with
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This emphasis on non-consent has prevailed in the United States as
well. In many jurisdictions, lack of consent was and is "of the essence of
the crime of forcible rape. .... -23 The problem American jurists found
with using non-consent as the controlling criminal standard was its sub-
jectivity. In order to prove lack of consent, the testimony of the female
accuser would have to be believed, as she was the only person who could
testify to her state of mind at the time of the attack. Courts were reluc-
tant to convict accused rapists on such testimony alone, primarily be-
cause of a fundamental distrust of the female complainant.2 4 As in the
Biblical story of Joseph and the deceptive wife of Potiphar, a woman
who cries rape was traditionally suspected of having ulterior motives, or
of inviting the so-called attack.2 5 One commentator suggested that
"[m]any women, for example, require as part of ordinary 'love play' ag-
gressive overtures by the man. ' 26 Courts have attributed motives such
as money, 27 or shame at being discovered in an illicit tryst 28 to rape
victims, and have thereby acquitted the accused assailants. Leading le-
gal scholars, such as John Henry Wigmore, warned against the "contriv-
ing false charges of sexual offenses" brought by women, and claimed
that "[t]he real victim . . . too often in such cases is the innocent
man. .... 29
making non-consent an element of rape, in contrast to Roman law which punished accused
rapists without regard to the consent of the woman:
[O]ur English law does not entertain quite such sublime ideas of the honour of either sex
as to lay the blame of a mutual fault upon one of the transgressors only; and therefore
makes it a necessary ingredient in the crime of rape, that it must be against the woman's
will.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 211.
23 People v. Fryman, 4 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 122 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1954); see supra note 2.
24 See generally Berger, supra note 8, at 21-30.
25 The wife of Potiphar, who was an officer of the Pharoah of Egypt, attempted to seduce
Joseph. When he spumed her advances and fled, she accused him of rape and had him
thrown into prison. Genesis 39: 7-20; see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 12-13.
26 Note, supra note 9, at 66.
27 One court stated that "[the complainant] further testified .... [t]hat she had already
become a girl of bad character at the time [the defendant] had relations with her, and that
she was induced to make the false statements by her mother, to enable the latter to force
money from [the defendant]. . . ." Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 281, 154 S.W. 969, 972
(1912).
28 The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Further, [the rape charge] may as well be accounted for by a belated sense of guilt occur-
ring when a dalliance unintentionally extended into the daylight hours and the prosecu-
trix felt the need to explain the presence of the defendant's auto on the driveway and his
departure from the house in case they had been observed.
People v. DeFrates, 33 Ill. 2d 190, 196, 210 N.E.2d 467, 470 (1965).
29 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourne rev. 1970). Wigmore's recommendation
was that all complainants in rape cases be required to undergo careful psychiatric screening
because of the pathological complexes inherent in all women. Critics of this section of his
evidence treatise note, however, that Wigmore fails to cite one actual case of a man falsely
convicted of rape, although he does relate five case histories of female sex fantasies, none of
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As a result of this distrust of the rape complainant's testimony, a
specialized consent standard evolved that differed from other legal defi-
nitions of consent. The standard was not a contractual one, where evi-
dence of a meeting of the minds of the parties was examined. Nor was
the standard one of freely given agreement, where any coercion negated
the apparent consent. Consent in rape was formulated in terms more
analogous to duress.30 As in duress, force and acquiescence could co-
exist in the same incident. The definition of rape required that both
force and lack of consent be proved, creating an inference that most
forceful sexual penetration was consensual. 3' It was believed that many
women enjoyed forceful sexual intercourse, or had such ambivalent feel-
ings about the act that although she did not expressly consent to the act,
a woman may have desired intercourse and used the excuse of forceful
penetration to mitigate her own guilt.3 2
Because such ambivalence or misleading actions by the female ac-
cuser could entrap a man, the consent standard used by the courts was
not only express consent, but also included "implied consent." As one
court explained,
[T]he consent given by prosecutrix may be implied as well as expressed,
and the defendant would be justified in assuming the existence of such
which resulted in the conviction of a man for a sex crime. See Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 337 (1973). One detailed study of this
section of Wigmore's treatise contends that Wigmore deliberately misrepresented the authori-
ties he relied on to substantiate the assertions made in § 924a. Bienen, A Question of Credibility:
John Hen,7 Wigmores Use of Scientifc Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL.
W.L. REv. 235 (1983).
30 Pateman explains the standard as follows:
The standard of "consent" in rape has been formulated within the same narrow bounda-
ries as "duress" in the performance of criminal acts. The legal failure to distinguish
between "acts of sexual assault" and "consenting relations among adults" or between
enforced submission and consent, is grounded in a complex of beliefs about the "natural"
characteristics of sex.
Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY 149, 158 (1980).
31 One commentator has explained the elements as follows:
The relationship between the concepts of force, lack of consent, and compelled conduct is
a lesson of life taught by experience. Society and the law have decided that compelled
conduct is not an exercise of freedom of choice. . . . [A] literal reading of the statutory
definition of rape indicates that the use of force and consent can coexist. In addition to
proof of force, the prosecutor must establish the negative, that the victim did not consent,
because there is an inference that the victim consented to the sexual conduct.
Note, Rape in Illinois: A Denial of Equal Protection, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 457, 459-60
(1975).
32 One commentator suggests that "a woman's need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the
unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the guilt feel-
ings which might occur after willing participation." Note, supra note 9, at 67. Lord Byron
expressed a similar attitude in his poem, Don Juan:
A little still she strove, and much repented,
And whispering, "I will ne'er consent," - consented.
G. BYRON, DON JUAN, Canto the first, CXVII (Marchand ed. 1958).
1983] 1523
COMMENTS
consent if the conduct of the prosecutrix toward him at the time of the
occurrence was of such a nature as to create in his mind the honest and
reasonable belief that she had consented by yielding her will freely to the
commission of the act.
3 3
The issue was not actual consent, "but rather behavior by the victim
short of consent that is taken to signal her sexual availability. '3 4 A wo-
man who sends out signals, such as drinking, dancing, or hitchhiking, is
assumed to have invited the rape.35 A victim's "provocative clothing"
or "sexually promiscuous" behavior are also signals of "implied" consent
that incriminate the testimony of the female complainant and pardon
the actions of the male defendant. 36
Although establishing consent in rape law does not appear to have
been difficult, proving non-consent was. The complainant's testimony
that "I did not give my consent" was insufficient, because women might
lie or mislead men.37 Instead of simply relying on such subjective evi-
dence, an "objective" standard, resistance, was used to prove lack of
consent beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the resistance standard, a
victim was required to physically resist the assailant, as an outward
manifestation of her lack of consent.38 Many jurisdictions held that "a
33 Taylor v. State, 249 Ala. 130, 133, 30 So. 2d 256, 258 (1947).
34 Ireland, Rape Reform Legislation: A New Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U. COLO. L.
REV. 185, 189; cf. State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980).
35 See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 32 Ala. App. 398, 26 So. 2d 419 (1946) (conviction reversed
where victim was drinking and implied consent given); People v. Hunt, N.Y. Times, July 31,
1977, at 24, col. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 20, 1977) (California Court of Appeals overturns rape
conviction because a hitchhiking victim "advertise[d]" consent to sexual advances); see also
cases described in H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 250 (1966). Kalven and
Zeisel found that even in cases where the law does not recognize such actions as consent, juries
will use a modified "assumption of risk" notion on their own and refuse to convict defendants
in such cases. See generally Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11
WILLAMETTE LJ. 36, 47 (1974). But see State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E.2d 44
(1967) (a woman's "contributory negligence" in going to a dance hall without "proper escort"
does not establish consent, although it is evidence to be considered by the jury on that
question).
36 See New York Times, May 27, 1977, at 9, col. 1 (Madison, Wisconsin trial court judge
placed fifteen-year-old boy who raped a sixteen-year-old girl on probation at home, stating
that boy responded "normally" to woman's provocative clothing); Chicago Sun-Times, July
27, 1982, at 4 (cites case of Wisconsin Circuit Judge who referred to a five-year-old sexual
assault victim as an "unusually sexually promiscuous young lady" and sentenced the attacker
to probation).
37 One commentator describes a case where the victim "failed to testify that she made the
least effort to prevent the defendant from having intercourse with her .... She testified, 'I
did not give my consent.' The [state] Supreme Court interpreted this to mean 'I did not give
my express consent' and held that this was not a sufficient manifestation of unwillingness to
negative consent." Note, supra note 4, at 189 (emphasis in original).
38 See Washburn, Rape Law: The Needfor Re/frm, 5 N.M.L. REV. 279, 283 (1975); Note,
Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 463, 474 (1975); Note, The
Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680, 682 (1966); Note, Towards a Con-
sent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 618 (1976).
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mere tactical surrender in the face of an assumed superior physical force
is not enough. Where the penalty for the defendant may be supreme, so
must resistance be unto the uttermost." 39 The "most vehement exercise
of every physical means" had to be used and continued "as long as [the
victim] has the power to do so until the offense is consummated. '40 The
resistance standard was justified by some courts on the grounds that it
was impossible to rape a woman against her will: "Indeed, medical
writers insist that these obstacles are practically insuperable in absence
of more than the usual relative disproportion of age and strength be-
tween men and women. '4 1 In recent years, those states continuing to
use the resistance standard have modified it to require only "earnest
resistance" 4 2 or "such resistance as will demonstrate that the act was
against [the victim's] will."'43
39 Moss v. State, 208 Miss. 531,536, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (1950); see also State v. Cowing, 99
Minn. 123, 108 N.W. 851 (1906).
40 Cascio v. State, 147 Neb. 1075, 1078-79, 25 N.W.2d 897, 900 (1947); see also People v.
Geddes, 301 Mich. 258, 261, 3 N.W.2d 266, 267 (1942). The court in Moss explained the
resistance standard as follows:
Initial force was ... not enough, for submission may follow. The courts were led there-
fore to examine the extent and duration of such force lest it fail to persist to the end. It
was logical to test this element by inquiring whether the victim failed to resist to the end.
It may be that capitulation has too often been construed as an abandonment, rather
than an exhaustion, of resistance.
208 Miss. at 537-38, 45 So. 2d at 125-27. The inference, of course, is that abandonment of
resistance after a struggle, or forced submission is consent, and renders the forcible act non-
criminal, while total exhaustion of a woman's physical resistance is required for legal non-
consent in rape.
41 Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 200, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (1906). Anthropologist Margaret
Mead expressed similar misconceptions: "By and large, within the same homogenous social
setting, an ordinarily strong man cannot rape an ordinarily strong healthy woman." M.
MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES 207 (1963), quoted in
Schwendinger & Schwendinger, Rape Aths. In Legal, Theroretical and Eveyday Practice, CRIME
AND SOC. JUST., 19 (Spring-Summer 1974). One judge has expressed the opinion that "he
himself could not conceptualize 'rape;' in his words, 'a hostile vagina will not admit a pe-
nis. . . ."' Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized." The Rape Victin and the Court, 58 JUDICA-
TURE 391, 398 (1975).
42 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13-A-6-60(8) (1982) (definition of "forcible compulsion" as
"physical force that overcomes earnest resistance"); see also infra notes 89-94 and accompany-
ing text.
43 People v. Wilcox, 33 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435, 337 N.E.2d 211, 215 (1975). "Utmost"
resistance is still requiied in Louisiana, however, for the crime of aggravated rape. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West Supp. 1983).
In Illinois, resistance is not required "where it would be futile" or "endanger the life of
the [victim], or where the victim is overcome by superior strength or paralyzed by fear."
People v. Smith, 32 Ill. 2d 88, 92, 203 N.E.2d 879, 881 (1965). Unless these circumstances are
shown, if the victim has use of her faculties and physical powers, she is required to resist.
People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill. 2d 457, 461, 185 N.E.2d 211, 213 (1962); People v. Warren, 113 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 6, 446 N.E.2d 591, 594 (1983). If the victim's actions fail to meet Illinois' resist-
ance requirement, the defendant is acquitted, even in cases where a trial court has made a
factual determination that resistance was sufficient or futile. See People v. Taylor, 48 Ill. 2d
91, 268 N.E.2d 865 (1971) (although defendant forced victim to enter his car with the threat
COMMENTS
B. THE MISCONCEPTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW
In recent years, the inadequacies of the common law definition of
consent have been revealed. The obstacles the common law created for
victims contributed to the low conviction rates reported for rape cases. 44
The law's underlying assumptions that women lie about rape charges or
desire forceful sexual intercourse are now seen as unfounded and offen-
sive.45 Thus, the idea that women "imply" consent by engaging in
otherwise normal activities, such as drinking or dancing, is clearly mis-
conceived. These may be activities designed to find companionship, or
they may be inherently risky activities, such as hitchhiking, but they are
in no way activities that presume an outcome that involves forceful sex-
ual penetration. 46 As one legal commentator observed nearly thirty
years ago, "The fiction of 'implied consent' has been used as a device to
assign certain consequences to certain factual situations despite the ab-
sence of an agreement, wish, desire or similar state of mind on the part
of a person. .... "47
The resistance requirement has also been criticized, as it is based on
the assumption that rape occurs in situations that permit a planned,
of a gun he never revealed and was not proved in court to exist, this is not a situation where
resistance would be futile and victim should have resisted); People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill. 2d 457,
185 N.E.2d 211 (1962) (where defendant drove to victim's house at 3:00 a.m. and they en-
gaged in conversation, there should be substantial physical evidence of a struggle to sustain a
conviction); People v. Warren, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1, 446 N.E.2d 591 (1983) (in conviction for
deviate sexual conduct, fact that 6-foot 3-inch, 185-pound defendant carried 5-foot 2-inch,
100-pound victim into a secluded woods was not sufficient to show that victim was overcome
by superior strength to justify lack of resistance); People v. Rosario, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 443
N.E.2d 273 (1982) (victim testified that she did not cry out or attempt to leave the car, so
resistance was insufficient to sustain conviction).
This resistance standard was one of the motivating factors behind recent efforts to reform
Illinois rape laws. The victim in the Warren case spoke out vigorously for passage of the
Illinois rape reform bill. In explaining her failure to resist, she stated, "I only wanted to come
out alive. When somebody tells you he's desperate, there are times when you believe that
person." Donosky, Rape victims relive horror to push new law, Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1983, at
1, col. 1.
44 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Washburn, supra note 38, at 306-07.
45 One commentator concludes:
The idea, so commonly entertained, that women somehow enjoy rape is absolutely un-
founded, and a further indication of the contempt that men feel for women and their
sexual functions. One might as well argue that because most men have repressed homo-
sexual or feminine elements in their personalities, they enjoy buggery and humiliation.
Greer, supra note 18, at 381; see also Schwendinger & Schwendinger, Rape Victins and the False
Sense of Guilt, 13 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 4, 16 (1980).
46 Women may put themselves in hazardous predicaments, but as Cook County Assistant
State's Attorney Julie Hamos noted, "I do believe, as does the women's community, that even
stupid women can be raped." Chicago Sun-Times, July 27, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (quoting Ms.
Hamos).




deliberative response by the victim. 48 It is also presumed that when
faced with such a situation, all rape victims will know how to respond
appropriately. Given historical and cultural patterns, however, women
have not generally been taught self-defense, but instead have been
taught to be submissive and passive.49 For example, one victim testified
that she did not resist her assailant because she "'didn't know how to,'
adding that she had never had any training and that no one had told
her what to do in such a situation."50 Furthermore, studies indicate that
victims who resist are more likely to be injured than victims who do
not.5 1 The resistance standard defines rape in terms of the actions of the
victim, rather than the culpable conduct of the assailant, condemning
the victim for failing to resist.5 2
The common law focus on lack of consent stems from a belief that
the act of rape is the same as consensual sexual intercourse, except that
one of the participants does not consent. Commentators have stated
that rape "is the only form of violent criminal assault in which the phys-
ical act accomplished by the offender (sexual intercourse) is an act
which may, under other circumstances, be desirable to the victim." 53
Modern sociological and psychological works have established,
however, that rape is not primarily a sexual crime, motivated by a desire
for sexual gratification. Instead, it is a violent assault motivated by hos-
tility, anger, and a need to dominate the victim. 54 The leading psycho-
logical study of convicted rapists found that
rape, rather than being primarily an expression of sexual desire, is, in fact,
the use of sexuality to express these issues of power and anger. Rape, then,
is a pseudo-sexual act, a pattern of sexual behavior that is concerned much
more with status, hostility, control, and dominance than with sensual plea-
sure or sexual satisfaction.55
48 Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra note 41, at 21.
49 Weis & Borges, Vitimology andRape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8 ISSUES IN CRIMI-
NOLOGY 71, 83 (1973); Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra note 45, at 7.
50 People v. Taylor, 48 Ill. 2d 91, 95, 268 N.E.2d 865, 867 (1971); see also Greer, supra note
18, at 376.
51 BATrELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE LAw AND JUSTICE STUDY CENTER, NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, FORCIBLE RAPE: POLICE VOLUME I 22 (1977).
52 See cases cited spra note 43.
53 Note, supra note 22, at 1503.
54 See, e.g., A. GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE (1979); Quenneville, Will Rape Ever Be A Crime of
the Past?.• A Feminist View of Societal Factors and Rape Law Reforms, 9 GOLDEN GATE L. REV.
581, 586-87 (1978-79); Weis & Borges, supra note 48, at 92.
55 A. GROTH, sura note 54, at 13. Groth, one of the leading authorities on sex offenders,
corroborates this statement by observing that rape is not the result simply of sexual arousal
that has no outlet, as one-third of the offenders studied were married and sexually active at
the time they committed the sexual assaults. Id. at 5. Groth also noted that one out of every
three offenders experienced some sort of sexual dysfunction during the assault, an indication
that rape is symptomatic of psychological conflict and anxiety, not sexual desire. Id. at 84-85.
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Thc nature of the act of rape is also markedly different from normal
voluntary sexual intercourse. Rape is characterized by the use of force,
coercion, or threats that place the victim in a state of fear and submis-
sion, rather than the willing participation usually experienced in sexual
intercourse. One survey found that some type of non-physical aggres-
sion, coercion, or intimidation was used in 87% of the rapes studied, 56
while actual physical force was used in 85% of the cases.57 The victim
was brutally beaten or choked in 32% of the cases.58 Rape is not an act a
victim would find desirable under consensual circumstances. As one
rape victim noted, "Who would consent to lying flat on her back in a
dark alley in January?" 59
Commentators have pointed out that the physiological differences
between men and women may be the source of misconceptions concern-
ing the impossibility of rape and the sexual pain or pleasure experienced
by rape victims. For the male perpetrator, the physical aspects of rape
and sexual intercourse are the same. For female victims, however, the
act of penetration can occur without sexual stimulation and with signifi-
cant pain:
Physiologically, male sexuality, . . . is dependent upon penile reactions.
Thus the male must experience some stimulation, and the result must be
physically pleasurable even if the situation is psychologically distasteful.
Therefore it may be difficult for a man to comprehend rape as anything
but a basically sexual experience for anyone who is engaged in it. . . .The
woman's claim that the rape was physically only painful and without any
pleasurable sensation . ..may be unintelligible to a man .... 60
Men may feel that despite the forceful or coercive aspects of an act, a
woman who does not actively resist must experience some sexual stimu-
lation and pleasure, and thus that act is like consensual sexual inter-
course. Objective, visible proof of the woman's distress and trauma was
thought to be necessary to distinguish the criminal act from the consen-
sual act.61
The old common law, defining rape in terms of the victim's lack of
consent, thus does not accurately characterize what is actually criminal
56 M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 152 (1971).
57 Id. at 155.
58 Id.
59 BohmerJudical.Atitudes TowardRape Victims, 59 JUDICATURE 303, 304 (1974) (quoting
victim).
60 Weis & Borges, supra note 49, at 104. The same physiological characteristics may have
contributed to the notion that "a hostile vagina will not admit a penis," since it is generally
true that a hostile penis cannot penetrate a vagina. See Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 41, at
398.
61 One court noted that "[i]t certainly must have been a very amicable struggle indeed, which
would inflict no bruises on the girl .. " State v. Burgdorf, 53 Mo. 65, 67 (1873) (emphasis
in original); see also supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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about rape. Rape is an act of violence, anger, and power, distinguished
by its coercive and sometimes brutal nature, and so the essence of rape is
the force or coercion used by the defendant, not the lack of consent of
the victim. The changing attitudes toward women brought about by
the women's movement have also dispelled notions that women desire
forceful sexual intercourse and will lie about the circumstances under
which it occurs. The goals of drafters writing new rape reform statutes,
therefore, are to identify force or coercion as the key element of the
crime, to eliminate the use of implied consent and the resistance stan-
dard, and to punish the defendant for his culpable actions, rather than
the victim for the failure to communicate her lack of consent. A survey
of those rape reform efforts follows in Section III.
III. CONSENT AND RAPE REFORM LAWS
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT REFORM AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE
In 1962, the American Law Institute issued its final draft of the
Model Penal Code, which was a comprehensive effort to update and
revise the criminal laws of the United States. 62 The sexual offenses sec-
tion was a significant departure from the common law definition of
rape, and it is the earliest rape reform statute. 63
The Model Penal Code creates two degrees of rape and a third sex-
ual crime called "Gross Sexual Imposition. '64 Second degree rape is
62 The Code was not intended as a mere restatement of the laws that already existed in
the various states, but was instead an attempt to strike a "fresh approach." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1 comment, at 306 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1980); see also
BA'ITELLE INSTITUTE REPORT, FORCIBLE RAPE: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 14, at 5.
63 The section on sexual offenses was first submitted to the American Law Institute in
1955, and was accepted without substantial change in 1962. BATrELLE INSTITUTE REPORT,
FORCIBLE RAPE: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 14, at 5.
64 The Model Penal Code provides:
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape
if.
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily
injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by ad-
ministering or employing without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for
the purpose of preventing resistance; or
(c) the female is unconscious; or
(d) the female is less than 10 years old.
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts
serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social compan-
ion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him
sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
(2) Gross Sexual Imposition. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife
commits a felony of the third degree if:
(a) he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of
ordinary resolution. ...
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1.
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committed when a man has sexual intercourse with a female, not his
wife, and "compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted
on anyone. ... 65 If the accused causes serious bodily injury or if the
victim was not a "voluntary social companion" of the accused at the
time the second degree rape was committed, the crime is first degree
rape.66
The Code definition of rape bears little resemblance to the defini-
tion under the common law.6 7 Not only is the use of force prohibited,
but serious threats against the victim, or anyone else, can be punished.68
In addition, explicit reference to the victim's lack of consent, as a sepa-
rate element of the crime, is deleted, and the focus of the definition is on
the defendant's actions that "compel" the victim. Compulsion, how-
ever, is defined in terms of the victim's submission. The Code does not,
therefore, completely discard the consent standard, as the comments ex-
plaining the Code indicate.69
The authors of the sexual offense section explain in their comments
that the Code approach "is not. . . that consent by the victim is irrele-
vant or that inquiry into the level of resistance by the victim cannot or
should not be made. Compulsion plainly implies non-consent .... "70
The resistance standard is rejected where force is proved,71 but "resist-
ance by a woman of ordinary resolution" is the statutory standard used
to define Gross Sexual Imposition, where the force exerted by the de-
fendant is not an element. 72 Thus, while the drafters intended to focus
primarily on the actions of the defendant, they continued to stress the
importance of the victim's non-consent. The drafters noted that "the
possibility of consent by the victim, even in the face of conduct that may
give some evidence of overreaching, cannot be ignored, ' 73 and echoed
the concern of other commentators concerning the ambivalence of wo-
men toward forceful sexual intercourse.74 It was therefore clearly in-
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 64.
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment, at 301-06.
70 Id. at 306.
71 The Code provides that "[w]here the proof establishes that the actor did compel sub-
mission to intercourse by force, the failure of a weak or fearful victim to display 'utmost' or
even 'earnest' resistance should not be exculpatory." Id.
72 Id. at § 213.1(2).
73 Id. at § 213.1 comment, at 303.
74 The commentary explains:
Often the woman's attitude may be deeply ambivalent. She may not want intercourse,
may fear it or may desire it, but feel compelled to say "no." The confusion at the time of
the act may later resolve into non-consent. Some have expressed the fear that a woman
who subconsciously wanted to have sexual intercourse will later feel guilty and cry rape.
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tended that the language "compels [the victim] to submit by force"
includes proof of the victim's non-consent. 75
Currently, no State uses the entire sexual offenses section of the
Code, but ten states have enacted statutes based on the Code's definition
of rape.76 None of these statutes make any explicit reference to the vic-
tim's lack of consent as a separate element of the crime. Rape is defined,
instead, as sexual intercourse by force which "compels" or "causes" the
victim to submit.77 In accord with the intent of the drafters of the Code,
Id. at 301-02; cf. supra note 32 and accompanying text.
75 Other aspects of the sexual offenses section of the Code have been sharply criticized and
have limited the appeal of the Code as a model statute. Section 213.6 of the Code, for exam-
ple, requires that juries be instructed to "evaluate the testimony of a victim. . . with special
care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the
truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6(5). This is a loose paraphrasing of the jury instruction formulated by Matthew
Hale, which stated that rape is "an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder yet to be defended by a party accused, though never so innocent." See generall Note,
Rape Instnrctions-RequiringJug to Examine Rape Victim5s Testimony With Caution is Inappropriate to
Modern Trial Proceedings-People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119 (1975), 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 691 (1976). The cautionary instruction has been
either judicially or statutorily eliminated in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Rincon-
Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
408 (1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (Purdon 1973).
The Code also prohibits the conviction of a defendant when the testimony of the victim
is uncorroborated. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5). This rule also has been abolished in
most jurisdictions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(1)(West 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520h (West Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (West Supp. 1981); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (Purdon 1973). Seegenerally Note, The Rape Corroboration Require-
ment: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE LJ. 1365 (1972).
These sections have led one commentator to characterize the Code as being based on a
"1950's view that rape was a crime fantasized by pseudo-victims ... " Bienen, Rape III,
supra note 14, at 176.
76 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-70 (West Supp.
1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 767 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (Bums 1979);
MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West Pam. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501
(1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.120-03
(Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Baldwin 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-302
(1977).
77 The 1975 Ohio rape statute reads: "(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: (1) The offender
purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force .. " OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.02. Note that the language "force or threat of force" replaces the Code's
more restrictive definition of "force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury,
extreme pain or kidnapping. . . ." See supra note 64. The Ohio statute also explicitly elimi-
nates the resistance standard for rape, but like the Code, uses the resistance of "a person of
ordinary resolution" to define the lesser crime of "Sexual Battery." See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.03.
The Wyoming statute, enacted in 1977, uses the following language:
(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the
first degree if:
(i) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably
calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement;
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these definitions have not eliminated lack of consent as an element, nor
have they eliminated use of the resistance standard.78 For example, the
Indiana Supreme Court, interpreting the 1976 Indiana rape statute, 79
held that "an element of the crime of rape is that the carnal knowledge
of the woman must be had against her will and consent, that is, it must
be compelled by force or imminent threat of force."80 Resistance con-
tinues to be necessary, according to the Indiana courts, "to a degree
which would indicate that the performance of the act is not volun-
tary. '81 The Colorado Supreme Court has given a similar interpreta-
tion of the Colorado sexual assault statute. 82 The court has held that
(ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury,
extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably
believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats....
Wyo. STAT. § 5-4-302. Compare this, however, with the language used to define second de-
gree sexual assault, which uses the victim's resistance as the measure of compulsion where
threats or coercion are used:
(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the
second degree if, under circumstances not constituted [sic] sexual assault in the first
degree:
(i) The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the future
against the victim or the victim's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters or children, and the
victim reasonably believes the actor will execute this threat. "To retaliate" includes
threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or extreme physical pain; (ii) The
actor causes submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance by a
victim of ordinary resolution;
(vi) The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this position of au-
thority to cause the victim to submit ...
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-303.
78 The Ohio statute, however, expressly eliminates the resistance requirement. See OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) ("A victim need not prove physical resistance to the offender
in prosecutions under this section").
79 The Indiana rape statute reads: "Rape. - (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally
has sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex when: (1) The other person is com-
pelled by force or imminent threat of force .. "IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1; see Indiana
Criminal Law Study Commission Comments to § 35-42-4-1 on the influence of the Model
Penal Code in Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (comments).
80 Lottie v. State, 406 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ind. 1980).
81 Birch v. State, 401 N.E.2d 750, 751 (Ind. App. 1980); see also Tillman v. State, 408
N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. 1980).
82 The Colorado sexual assault statute provides in part:
18-3-402. Sexual Assault in the first degree. (1) The actor who knowingly inflicts sexual
penetration on a victim commits sexual assault in the first degree if: (a) The actor
causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physi-
cal violence; or (b) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone, and
the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats; or (c)
The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the future against
the victim, or any other person, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will execute
this threat. . ..
18-3-403. Sexual Assault in the second degree.
(1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim
commits sexual assault in the second degree if:
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the sexual assault definition makes the absence of consent "of critical
importance," as the "words 'causes submission' imply non-consensual
yielding to the actor's demands.18 3
Thus, although the Model Penal Code and those states which have
followed its lead differ markedly from the common law, the practical
effect of these definitions of rape does not appear to have been very sig-
nificant. The victim's lack of consent continues to play an essential role
in rape prosecutions, and in most of the jurisdictions, the resistance stan-
dard has not been eliminated. Indeed, it has been noted that the "basic
change brought about by the Code is not so much with regard to defini-
tion as it is to grade the offense .... "84 The approach of the Model
Penal Code and its progeny, while stressing the aspect of force involved
in rape, still does not clearly define rape as a crime of force and coercion
exerted by the defendant.
B. THE RESISTANCE STANDARD AND THE PENAL LAWS OF NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON
At the same time the American Law Institute was considering the
Model Penal Code, New York enacted its own rape reform law.85 The
New York law explicitly maintains lack of consent as an element of each
sex crime by providing that "[w]hether or not specifically stated, it is an
element of every [sex] offense . . .that the sexual act was committed
without consent of the victim."8 6 There are three degrees of rape, al-
though only the most serious degree involves adult victims capable of
consent.8 7 First degree rape is committed when a man engages in sexual
intercourse with a female "[b]y forcible compulsion." 88 When the New
York law was enacted in 1965, "forcible compulsion" was defined as
"physical force that overcomes earnest resistance; or a threat, express or
implied, that places a person in fear of immediate death or serious physi-
cal injury to himself or another person, or in fear that he or another
(a) The actor causes submission of the victim to sexual penetration by any means other
than those set forth in section 18-3-402, but of sufficient consequence reasonably calcu-
lated to cause submission against the victim's will....
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -403.
83 People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1, 4 n.5 (Colo. 1981).
84 Stone & Hall, The Model Penal Code in Idaho?, 8 IDAHO L. REv. 219, 237 (1972).
85 The New York statute was based, in part, on the early drafts of the MODEL PENAL
CODE. The New York law, however, bears little resemblance to the Code. See Note, supra
note 22, at 1512.
86 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 1975).
87 Third degree rape, § 130.25, involves females less than 17, or otherwise incapable of
consent; second degree rape, § 130.30, involves girls under the age of 14. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 130.05, 130.25.
88 Id. at § 130.35.
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person will immediately be kidnapped." 89
The New York statute codified the resistance standard and made it
the central focus of the definition of rape. Although the term "forcible
compulsion" alone seems to describe the actions of the assailant, the def-
inition of the term refers primarily to the victim's resistance. The degree
of resistance required was not even "reasonable," but "earnest." 90 The
New York statute has been criticized as "a regressive step in the develop-
ment of modern rape law," 91 but it has been very influential. Seven
states currently use the term forcible compulsion, together with the 1965
definition.92
In New York, the term "earnest resistance" was interpreted to
mean utmost resistance by the state appellate courts. In People v. Yanik,
the trial court conviction was overturned on appeal because "[r]ape is
not committed unless the woman oppose[d] the man to the utmost limit
of her power. . . .A feigned or passive or perfunctory resistance is not
enough. It must be genuine and active and proportioned to the out-
rage."' 93 The Yanik decision, however, prompted the New York legisla-
ture to modify "earnest resistance" by defining it as only such resistance
as was reasonable under the circumstances. 94 Finally, in 1982, the term
"earnest resistance" was eliminated completely in New York, although
it persists in the seven states that continue to use the 1965 definition.95
Five other states have codified the resistance standard, although
their definitions of rape do not correspond to the New York formula-
tion.96 Three additional states use the New York language "forcible
89 Id. at § 130.00(8).
90 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
91 Note, supra note 22, at 1513.
92 ALA. CODE §§ 13-A-6-60, -6-61, -6-70 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010, .020,
.040 (Baldwin 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.030, .061 (Vernon's 1979 & Supp. 1983); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 163.305, .375 (1981); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (Supp. 1982) (uses "ear-
nest resistance" to define "without consent," rather than forcible compulsion); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-406 (1978 & Supp. 1981) ("earnest resistance" used to define situation where
"actor compels the victim"); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1, -2, -3 (1977) ("earnest resistance"
modified by additional statement that "[f]or purposes of this definition, 'resistance' includes
physical resistance or any clear communication of the victim's lack of consent'). Hawaii used
the New York formulation until 1981, when it amended the statute to delete all references to
"earnest resistance." See HAwAII REV. STAT. § 707.700 (Supp. 1982).
93 People v. Yanik, 55 A.D.2d 164, 167, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 98, 101 (1977) (quoting People v.
Carey, 223 N.Y. 519, 520, 199 N.E. 83, 83 (1918)).
94 See NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 130.00 and supplementary commentaries (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983).
95 Id.; see supra note 92. The new definition of "forcible compulsion" is the use of "physi-
cal force or threat, express or implied, which force or threat places a person in fear of immedi-
ate death or serious physical injury to himself, herself or another person, or in fear that he, she
or another person will immediately be kidnapped." NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 130.00(8).
96 IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (1979) (rape is sexual intercourse "where the victim resists but
her resistance is overcome by force or violence'); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3502 (1981) (rape is
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compulsion" or "compulsion" as the key element in rape, but define the
term without reference to the victim's resistance.
97
The Washington rape law, which has been widely recognized as a
major rape reform statute, uses the term "forcible compulsion," but pro-
vides its own definition. Under the Washington statute, "forcible com-
pulsion" is "physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat,
express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical in-
jury."98 Lack of consent is not expressly referred to in the definition of
first and second degree rape "in order to deflect attention away from the
victim." 99 The use of the term "resistance," however, is simply a restate-
ment of the common law objective standard that was used to prove lack
of consent, and therefore places a burden on the victim to resist to show
her non-consent. 1° ° Rather than deflecting attention away from the
victim, the resistance standard focuses attention on the victim.
The relevancy of consent in rape cases under the Washington stat-
ute is further underscored by the definition of third degree rape. Force
need not be used to accomplish the sexual act; the statute simply re-
committed when "a woman's resistance is overcome by force or fear"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:42 (West Supp. 1983) (aggravated rape occurs without the lawful consent of the victim
and where the victim "resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is overcome by
force"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 1982) (rape occurs where the victim
resists but the resistance is overcome by force and violence); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121
(rape is committed by forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion that would "pre-
vent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution"). The California Code previously defined
rape as sexual intercourse "where the person resists but the resistance is overcome by force or
violence"; this definition was repealed in 1980 and replaced by the phrase "where it is accom-
plished against a person's will." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982-83).
97 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1801(2), -1803(b) (1977) (" 'forcible compulsion' means physi-
cal force or threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any
person'); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707.700 (Supp. 1982) (forcible compulsion means the use of
or attempt to use a threat of bodily injury, a dangerous weapon, or physical force); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 251, 252 (1983) (" 'compulsion' means physical force or a threat of
physical force. . . which makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or which pro-
duces. . . a reasonable fear').
98 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010 (Supp. 1982). Forcible compulsion is used to de-
fine both first and second degree rape:
§ 9A.44.040, Rape in the first degree:
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when such person engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not married to the perpetrator by forcible compulsion
where the perpetrator or an accessory:
(a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon; or (b) Kidnaps the victim; or (c) Inflicts
serious physical injury; or (d) Feloniously enters into the building or vehicle where the
victim is situated.
§ 9A.44.050, Rape in the second degree:
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, under circumstances not consti-
tuting rape in the first degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with another
person, not married to the perpetrator:
(a) By forcible compulsion. ...
99 Loh, supra note 15, at 551.
100 ,See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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quires that "the victim did not consent . . . and such lack of consent
was clearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct."'' Consent is
defined to mean "that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse there
are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have
sexual intercourse."' 10 2 Third degree rape is an attempt to recognize a
victim's right to privacy, to simply refuse sexual intercourse and be pro-
tected by the criminal law, even though no force or coercion was
used.10
3
Washington's third degree rape section, however, has been criti-
cized because it appears to create a crime without respect to the crimi-
nal intent of the accused. Since the definition assumes that no force or
coercion is used, the accused assailant may not have intended to commit
a criminal act; the victim may have simply failed to communicate effec-
tively her non-consent.10 4 The use of a different criminal standard in
third degree rape in contrast to the resistance standard used in first and
second degree rape confuses the relationship between consent and resist-
ance.' 0 5 It also appears that this statutory effort to encourage the prose-
cution of acquaintance rapes has not had a substantial effect. Out of
122 rape cases analyzed in one Washington study, only two were third
degree rape cases,10 6 and one Washington prosecutor stated that third
degree rape is only rarely charged.' 0 7
The use of the resistance standard, even when couched in terms of
"forcible compulsion," is simply a continuation of the common law em-
phasis on non-consent. The victim's reaction defines the criminal stan-
dard, rather than the defendant's culpable conduct. In addition, the
101 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060.
102 Id. at § 9A.44.010(6); cf. infra note 142 and accompanying text.
103 According to one Washington study, the use of force and subsequent resistance is re-
duced when the victim and assailant are acquainted, so the intent of the third degree rape
section is to facilitate the conviction of more acquaintance rapes. See Loh, supra note 15, at
590. New York and West Virginia have similar statutes, labelled "sexual misconduct." See
N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.20; W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-9. A similar recognition of the particular
circumstances of acquaintance rape is expressed in the MODEL PENAL CODE usage of the
term "voluntary social companion." See supra note 63; Loh, supra note 15, at 555-56, 620-21.
104 BATrELLE INSTITUTE REPORT, FORCIBLE RAPE: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 14, at 11.
The Battelle Institute Report noted that "it has been suggested that consent be obtained in
writing before engaging in intercourse in Washington." Id.
105 Questions are also raised as to whether third-degree rape is a lesser included offense of
the more serious crimes. Id. at 10. The New York statute, which labels a similar crime "sex-
ual misconduct" as opposed to "rape," may signify that sexual misconduct is not intended as
a lesser included offense of rape. At least one New York court, however, has held that even in
sexual misconduct cases, the lack of consent must be the result of the same forcible compul-
sion as in rape cases. People v. Dailey, 94 Misc. 2d 941, 405 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1978); cf. rationale
expressed supra note 103 and accompanying text.
106 Loh, supra note 15, at 602.
107 Telephone Interview with Becky Roe, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, King
County, Washington (May 27, 1983).
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Washington combination of resistance and consent in one statutory sec-
tion confuses the standard of proof and is apparently unsuccessful in
reaching those acquaintance rape cases it is intended to cover. The New
York and Washington definitions of rape obviously do not meet the
goals of rape reformers in updating the law's attitude and approach to
victims and to the crime of rape.
C. THE ELIMINATION OF NON-CONSENT AS AN ELEMENT AND THE
MICHIGAN CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT ACT
The limited changes brought about by the Model Penal Code and
the New York Penal Code disappointed victim-advocates, and
prompted those reformers to write their own laws. 10 8 The Michigan
Criminal Sexual Conduct Act, 10 9 passed in 1974, was the first victim-
oriented and -initiated rape statute enacted."10 It has served as a model
for eight other state statutes and had a significant influence on Illinois'
recently enacted rape reform bill."'
Under the Michigan statute, "criminal sexual conduct" is defined
as sexual penetration where "[f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish
the sexual penetration."' 1 2 The definition does not mention the victim's
lack of consent or the victim's submission to intercourse. In addition,
108 Bienen, Rape III, supra note 14, at 171-76. For a history of attempts to pass reform
legislation, see J. MARSH, THE LIMrrS OF RAPE REFORM, 11-19 (1982); Bienen, Rape I, 3
WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 45-57 (1976); Weddington, Rape Law in Texas: HB. 284 and the Road
to Rerm, 4 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 1 (1975).
109 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520 (a)-0) (West Supp. 1982).
1to Commentators have characterized the Michigan statute as one of the most far-reaching
reforms enacted to date. See Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 217, 217-18 (1974).
'1 See infra note 129.
112 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d. The statute divides criminal sexual conduct into
four degrees; second and fourth degree criminal sexual conduct involve sexual contact or
touching by force or coercion, and first and third degree sexual conduct involve sexual pene-
tration by force or coercion, as follows:
§ 750.520b. Criminal sexual conduct in first degree.
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in
sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of any
other felony.
(d) The actor is aided or abetted by 1 or more other persons and either of the
following circumstances exists:
(i) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective,
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.
(ii) The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration. Force or
coercion includes but is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in subdivision (f) (i)
to (v).
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
(0 The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to
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the resistance standard is expressly eliminated by the statute. 1 3 The
crime is defined solely in terms of the defendant's use of "force or
coercion."
The Michigan act provides a lengthy definition of "force or coer-
cion," which "includes but is not limited to" overcoming the victim
through the actual application of physical force or violence, threats to
use force or violence, threats to retaliate in the future against the victim
or anyone, or concealment or surprise."14 This language "eliminates
where possible any reference to the victim's conduct as a separate ele-
ment of the crime," making force or coercion the essence of rape, rather
than lack of consent." 15 It is not necessary, therefore, to prove non-con-
sent beyond a reasonable doubt at the outset. 1 6 Moreover, the Michi-
gan House Judiciary Committee stated that
[t]he question as to whether or not the victim "consented" is not an issue in
any felony other than rape. This bill [the Criminal Sexual Assault Act]
would make the rape standard consistent with the standard for other felo-
nies by allowing the victim to assess rationally the danger of injury or
death and conduct himself/herself accordingly. 17
The Michigan statute has been hailed as a major revision refuting
accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any of
the following circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical
force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or vio-
lence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to
execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate in the
future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that the actor has
the ability to execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, "to retaliate" includes
threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim
in manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable.
(v) When the actor, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to
overcome the victim. ...
§ 750.520d. Criminal sexual conduct in third degree.
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the person engages
in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances ex-
ists:
(b) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual penetration. Force or coercion
includes but is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in section 520b(l) (f)(i) to
(V). ...
113 Michigan Law provides that "[a] victim need not resist the actor in prosecution under
[this act]." MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520i.
114 Id. at § 750.520b(1)(O; see supra note 112.
115 Note, supra note 22, at 1513; see also Note, rupra note 110, at 226.
116 See People v. Jansson, 116 Mich. App. 674, 682, 323 N.W.2d 508, 512 (1982).
117 House Judiciary Committee analysis of Senate Bill 1207 (June 27, 1974), quoted in Peo-
ple v. Nelson, 79 Mich. App. 303, 318 n.31, 261 N.W.2d 299, 307 n.31 (1977), modfldon other
grounds-, 406 Mich. 1020, 281 N.W.2d 134 (1979).
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the common law assumptions about rape." The law's proponents
praise the reform as properly directing the "court's attention to the level
of violence used, rather than to the victim's prior sexual activity. The
legislation reflects the fact that the motives of the rapist are not primar-
ily sexual and therefore, traditional ideas about sex do not apply to the
rape situation."" 9 Critics, however, charge that the law is overbroad
and covers entirely innocent conduct. 120 The American Law Institute
contends that the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act "gives virtually no indi-
cation of the intended reach of the serious sanctions employed." 12' Ac-
cording to the American Law Institute, the language which states that
the definition of force or coercion "includes but is not limited to" the
enumerated circumstances 122 makes the entire definition vague and
open-ended. In addition, the use of the phrase "overcomes the victim"
in combination with the provision eliminating the resistance standard
puts the question of force "in terms that seem hardly intelligible."' 123
The American Law Institute's criticisms of the Michigan law are
based on the Institute's continuing view of rape as a crime that would be
desirable to the victim under other circumstances. 124 This apparently
makes rape a unique crime, where the defendant's use of force can only
be measured in terms of the victim's resistance. In other felonies, such as
robbery, the resistance of the victim is not a factor at all, as a forceful
taking is presumed to be without the consent of the victim. 125 The
Michigan statute creates the same presumption in rape cases. Rape is
presumed to be an act of anger or violence that is non-consensual, rather
than a sexually gratifying experience that is usually consensual and
desirable.
Under the Michigan statute, the word "consent" is not mentioned
at all. 126 It appears, however, that the drafters of the law intended that
118 Note, supra note 110, at 235.
119 Id. at 236.
120 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment, at 295. The Michigan Court of Appeals, how-
ever, has upheld the criminal sexual conduct act as not overbroad; the court found that the
statute did not cover innocent as well as criminal conduct. People v. Dalton, 83 Mich. App.
725, 729, 269 N.W.2d 280, 282 (1978).
121 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment, at 295.
122 Id.;seealso MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520b(I)(0; supra note 114 and accompany-
ing text.
123 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment, at 296-97.
124 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
125 For example, Illinois defines robbery as follows: "A person commits robbery when he
takes property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening
the imminent use of force." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 18-1 (1981); see also supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
126 See People v. Jansson, 116 Mich. App. 674, 682, 323 N.W.2d 508, 512 (1982) ("[t]he
statute is silent on the defense of consent").
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consent be used as an affirmative defense. During the legislative debate
on the act, one of the drafters explained that
if actual force or threats of force sufficient to meet the "force" requirement
can be shown, it is redundant to also require a separate showing of "non-
consent" as part of the case in chief. . . . When the victim is threatened
with a dangerous weapon, or is beaten, robbed or kidnapped, the possibil-
ity of her willingly consenting to sexual intercourse is so unlikely that it
ought to be raised as an alternative theory for the defense rather than have
to be shown from the outset.1 27
Although the statute itself does not state that consent is available as a
defense, the Michigan appellate courts have followed the drafters' intent
and have established that consent can be raised as a defense to charges
of criminal sexual conduct. In People v. Hearn, the court of appeals held
that
[a]lthough the statute does not specifically address the consent defense, its
various provisions when considered together clearly imply the continuing
validity of that defense. Certainly the Legislature, in eliminating the neces-
sity of proof of nonconsent by the prosecution, did not intend to preclude
an accused from alleging consent as a defense to the charge.1
28
The courts, however, have not defined consent. The statute itself pro-
vides no guidance, except to preclude the use of the resistance
standard. 129
127 V. NORDBY, LEGAL EFFEcrs OF PROPOSED RAPE REFORM BILLS S.B. 1207, H.B. 5802
at 7-8 (submitted to Michigan House Judiciary Committee on April 23, 1974). This analysis,
written by one of the drafters of the Michigan bill, is cited in People v. Nelson, 79 Mich. App.
303, 321 n.36, 261 N.W.2d 299, 308-09 n.36 (1977), modiedon other grounds , 406 Mich. 1020,
281 N.W.2d 134 (1979), and People v. Kahn, 80 Mich. App. 605, 619 n.5, 264 N.W.2d 360,
366-67 n.5 (1978).
128 100 Mich. App. 749, 755, 300 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1980); see also Kahn, 80 Mich. App. at
619 n.5, 264 N.W.2d at 366-67 n.5. In Heam, the defendant testified that the act of sexual
intercourse was consensual, while the victim and her boyfriend testified that the defendant
forced the victim into his car with a gun and knife. 100 Mich. App. at 752, 300 N.W.2d at
397-98. The trial court instructed the jury only on the elements of sexual penetration and the
defendant's use of force (being armed with a weapon). Id. at 755, 300 N.W.2d at 398. The
defendant appealed the failure to instruct the jury on the consent defense. The prosecution
argued that as non-consent was not an element of the crime, consent could not be a defense.
Id. at 753, 300 N.W.2d at 398. The court of appeals reversed, holding that failure to instruct
the jury on the consent defense was reversible error. But seeJansson, 116 Mich. App. at 686,
323 N.W.2d at 514, where the court of appeals held that failure to give a jury instruction on
consent was not reversible error for a charge of third degree criminal assault (use of force to
overcome the victim without the use of a weapon). The court injansson explained its holding,
stating that
[p]roving in Hearn that the defendant was armed with a weapon at the time of the act
would not, in and of itself, prove nonconsent as would proving that the act was commit-
ted by force or coercion in this case. In other words, the issue of consent is not necessarily
implicated in a decision as to whether the defendant was armed with a weapon whereas
the question of consent is, of necessity, addressed in a determination as to whether the act
was committed by force or coercion.
116 Mich. App. at 686, 323 N.W.2d at 514. But see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Eight other states have based their definition of rape on Michigan's
formulation of "force or coercion."1 30 None of the statutes explicitly pro-
vide that consent may be a defense to a charge of rape, 13 although the
New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines a consent defense that is
available for all criminal prosecutions. 132 That provision is not very ef-
fective in rape cases, however, since it states that consent will not be
legally recognized if it is "induced by force, duress, or deception of a
kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." 133
The omission of a statutory definition of consent in these statutes
poses a real possibility that the courts will rely on precedents using the
common law definitions of consent. In many jurisdictions, this could
mean that the "fiction of implied consent" will be applied, and actions
130 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.341-.343 (West Supp. 1982) ("force or coercion"); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-319 (1979) ("force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion or deception");
N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 1982) ("force or coercion"); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-
10, -11 (Supp. 1982) ("force or coercion"); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-1, -2 (1981) ("force or
coercion"); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -654 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) ("aggravated
force," "aggravated coercion" and "force or coercion"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1
(Smith Supp. 1983) ("force or coercion'); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-602 to -604 (1982)
("force or coercion'). The rape reform bill recently passed by the Illinois General Assembly
was also based on the Michigan statute, but uses the term "force or threat of force." See infra
note 177 and accompanying text.
131 The South Carolina statute, like the Michigan law, does not mention the term consent
at all, but the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that consent is available as a defense,
since the term "force or coercion" in the statute appears to mean that the sexual assault
"occurred under circumstances where the victim's consent was lacking." State v. Hamilton,
276 S.E.2d 784, 786 (S.C. 1981) (quoting State v. Cox, 266 S.E.2d 784, 786 (S.C. 1980)). The
court did not, however, describe the circumstances under which the consent defense could be
raised, nor did it define what conduct constituted consent. The New Mexico law also leaves
the consent issue open. Although the New Mexico Court of Appeals has stated that
"[a]bsence of consent is not an element of the crime as defined by the Legislature," the court
did not address the question of consent as a defense under the rape statute. State v. Jiminez,
89 N.M. 652, 655, 556 P.2d 60, 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
132 N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 1982) provides:
a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or
to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or
precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense.
b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because
it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such
harm is a defense ifi-
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not
serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards ofjoint participa-
tion in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law. . ..
c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the
offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense.
See also Bienen, Rape III, supra note 14, at 183.
133 N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2C2-10(c)(3).
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by the victim such as hitchhiking or drinking will be construed by the
court as consent. 134 In those states where the use of the resistance stan-
dard has not been expressly precluded by statute, a victim's failure to
resist the assailant could also be considered consent. 35
In contrast, the Minnesota Criminal Code includes a reform defini-
tion of consent. The basic elements of the crime of criminal sexual con-
duct are sexual penetration accomplished by force or coercion. 1 36 The
victim's lack of consent is not included in the definition of the crime. In
a separate "Definitions" section, however, the statute explains that
"'Consent' means a voluntary uncoerced manifestation of a present
agreement to perform a particular sexual act. 1 37 This definition clearly
precludes the use of implied consent, as a present agreement to the par-
ticular sexual act must be manifested. The Minnesota Code also clearly
states that consent is not a defense in crimes involving minors. 38 The
statute does not indicate whether consent is to be used as a defense in
adult cases. The term appears only in the definitions section and the
provisions dealing with children and teenagers. The language, however,
appears to indicate that consent was intended to be used as a defense in
134 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
136 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. . . if he engages in
sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exist:
(a) The complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months
older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to
the act by the complainant is a defense; or
(b) The complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is
more than 48 months older than the complainant and in a position of authority over the
complainant, and uses this authority to cause the complainant to submit. Neither mis-
take as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
or
(c) Circumstances existing at the time of the act cause the complainant to have a
reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to the complainant or another; or
(d) The actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in
a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and
uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit; or
(e) The actor causes personal injury to the complainant and either of the following
circumstances exist:
(i) The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration; or
(ii) The actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally defec-
tive, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; or
(C The actor is aided or abetted by one or more accomplices. . . and either of the
following circumstances exists:
(i) An accomplice uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit; or
(ii) An accomplice is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fash-
ioned in manner to lead the complainant reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous
weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to
submit.
137 Id. at § 609.341(4).
138 See, e.g., id. at § 609.342.
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adult cases, not as an element of the crime.139 The Minnesota Jury In-
structions, however, list lack of consent as an element of criminal sexual
conduct that must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt. 140
This confusion over the use of the Minnesota definition of consent
limits the effectiveness of the statute in changing the traditional miscon-
ceptions about rape. Although implied consent and the resistance stan-
dard appear to have been eliminated by the Minnesota definition, lack
of consent continues to be an element of rape. The omission of a consent
definition in Michigan raises the possibility that an implied consent
standard will be used by the courts. Despite these drawbacks, however,
the Michigan model defining rape in terms of "force or coercion" is the
most significant victim-oriented reform statute to date, and has led the
nationwide reform movement.
D. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF CONSENT AND THE WISCONSIN
SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE
In contrast to the Michigan approach, other statutes have dealt
with the problem of implied consent and resistance by retaining lack of
consent as an element of rape, but redefining the term. A consent defi-
nition that protects an individual's ability to expressly consent or with-
hold consent to sexual intercourse reflects recent changes in the law
regarding personal privacy rights.141
The Wisconsin sexual assault statute, enacted in 1975, codifies this
alternative, and defines sexual assault as "sexual contact or sexual inter-
course with another person without consent of that person by use or
threat of force or violence."' 142 Consent is explicitly defined as "words or
139 Lack of consent is not mentioned at all as part of the definition of the crime; indeed, the
only reference to consent is to preclude its use as a defense in child sexual assault cases. Tele-
phone Interview with Jerry Anderson, Minnesota Attorney General's Office (May 27, 1983).
140 MINNESOTA PRACTICE-MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 12.02 (1983 Pocket
Part). One Minnesota District Attorney speculated that the District Judges Association,
when drafting the instructions, inferred that lack of consent was to be included as a basic
element of the crime from the wording of the statute. Telephone Interview with Mike
Kolitch, Hennepin County District Attorney's Office, Minnesota (September 26, 1983).
141 See Weiner, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 155-58 (1983); Note, Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A
Statutoy Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. L. Rsv. 201, 207.
142 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982) provides:
(1) First degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class
B felony:
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of
that person and causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person.
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of
that person by pse or threat of use of a dangerous weapon or any article used or fash-
ioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon.
(c) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual contact or
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overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent
indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual
contact."
143
Like the common law definition of rape, 144 the Wisconsin statute
includes both force and lack of consent as elements of the crime. The
specific, almost contractual, definition of consent1 45 precludes the use of
implied consent or lack of resistance by the victim. That definition was
challenged in Gates v. State 146 as an unconstitutional shift in the burden
of proof. The defendant claimed that the definition of consent created a
"presumption. . . that all acts of sexual contact or intercourse are with-
out consent unless shown to have been preceded by words or overt ac-
tions of consent."1 4 7 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected this claim
because the statute required that the prosecution prove not only the
existence of force and sexual penetration, but also lack of consent. 1
4 8
sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person by use or threat of
force or violence.
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 12 years of age or
younger.
(2) Second degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a
Class C felony:
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of
that person by use or threat of force or violence.
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of
that person and causes injury, illness, disease or impairment of a sexual or reproductive
organ, or mental anguish requiring psychiatric care for the victim.
(c) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who suffers from a
mental illness or deficiency which renders that person temporarily or permanently inca-
pable of appraising the person's conduct, and the defendant knows of such condition.
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the defendant knows
is unconscious.
(e) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who is over the age of 12
years and under the age of 18 years without consent of that person, as consent is defined
in sub. (4).
(3) Third degree sexual assault. Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person with-
out the consent of that person is guilty of a Class D felony.
(3m) Fourth degree sexual assault. Whoever has sexual contact with a person with-
out the consent of that person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(4) Consent. "Consent," as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a
person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to
have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. A person under 15 years of age is incapable of
consent as a matter of law. The following persons are presumed incapable of consent but
the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence. ...
(a) A person who is 15 to 17 years of age,
(b) A person suffering from a mental illness or defect which impairs capacity to
appraise personal conduct,
(c) A person who is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to
communicate unwillingness to an act.
143 Id.
144 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
145 Note, supra note 22, at 1516 n.91.
146 91 Wis. 2d 512, 283 N.W.2d 474 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
147 Id. at 520, 283 N.W.2d at 477.
148 Id.
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One commentator has criticized this combination of force and con-
sent as meaningless, since proof of force or coercion would appear to
preclude the need for further proof of a lack of voluntary agreement. 49
Retaining consent as part of the basic definition of rape also perpetuates
the notion that sexual assault is simply non-consensual sexual
intercourse. 150
The Wisconsin definition of consent does, however, eliminate the
resistance requirement and the implied consent standard. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, in State v. Clark,'5' held that "[t]he plain wording of
the statutory definition of consent demonstrates that the failure to resist
is not consent; the statute requires 'words' or 'overt acts' demonstrating
'freely given consent." ' 152 The court also rejected the defendant's con-
tention that the "passive cooperation" of the fifteen-year-old victim
constituted consent.' 53 Although the victim's actions were "arguably
ambiguous or even demonstrative of consent," the court was unwilling
to imply consent from those actions, and upheld the defendant's convic-
tion. 154 Two years later, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reinforced this
rejection of implied consent in State v. Lederer.155 The court there held
that a victim's verbal protests were sufficient to indicate non-consent,
and concluded that "'No' means no. .... 156
Only one other state, Vermont, has used Wisconsin's language con-
cerning consent. 157 Although Florida has enacted a similar statute de-
149 See Note, supra note 22, at 1516 n.91 (criticizing the Minnesota statute).
150 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
151 87 Wis. 2d 804, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1978).
152 Id. at 815, 275 N.W.2d at 721.
153 Id at 816, 275 N.W.2d at 721.
154 Id. at 818, 275 N.W.2d at 721.
155 99 Wis. 2d 430, 299 N.W.2d 457 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). In Lederer the victim had volun-
tarily accompanied the defendant to an empty house. When the defendant threatened the
victim, she did not resist and only verbally protested as the defendant committed acts of
sexual penetration. In upholding the defendant's conviction, the court disagreed with the
defendant's argument that "two parties may enter into consensual sexual relations without
manifesting freely given consent through words or acts. We reject this contention as we know
of no other means of communicating consent." Id. at 435, 299 N.W.2d at 460.
156 Id. at 436, 299 N.W.2d at 461.
157 The Vermont statute, enacted in 1977, defines consent as "words or actions by a person
indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act. . . ." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3251(3) (Supp. 1982). Sexual assault occurs when an accused "compels [a] person to par-
ticipate in a sexual act: (A) Without the consent of [that] person; or (B) By threatening or
coercing the other person; or (C) by placing [that] person in fear that any person will be
harmed imminently." Id. at § 3252. The Vermont courts have not expressed an opinion on
whether the consent definition eliminates implied consent. The Vermont statute, however,
specifically eliminates the need for resistance by the victim, in a separate section. See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254(l). The Minnesota statute contains language defining consent
similar to Wisconsin and Vermont, but the term consent is not part of the definition of the
crime. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6
(West Supp. 1983), which states that in rape cases, where consent "is at issue, 'consent' shall
1546 COMMENTS [Vol. 74
fining lack of consent, 158 the experience in Florida indicates that even a
consent definition using the concept of a knowing and voluntary consent
may still allow the courts to use the resistance standard and implied
consent. The Florida sexual battery statute, which defines consent as
"intelligent, knowing and voluntary consent and shall not be construed
to include coerced submission," includes non-consent as an element in
all degrees of sexual battery.1 59 This definition appears to connote an
express consent only, although the Florida Court of Appeals has held
that "consent may be actual or implied."' 60 The Florida courts also
continue to use the resistance standard, 16 1 but proof of physical resist-
ance is not required "where other circumstances show the victim did not
intelligently and knowingly agree to the battery."' 62
The definition of consent in the Wisconsin statute is the most pro-
gressive in the country and provides the most protection to an individ-
be defined to mean positive cooperation in an act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free
will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act
or transaction involved." The term consent is not used in the California definition of rape,
although the statute does use the term "against a person's will." Id. at § 261; see supra note 95.
Nine other states use non-consent as an element of the crime of rape, but define lack of
consent in terms of traditional standards, such as forcible compulsion or resistance. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 767 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (1981).
158 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976):
(1) Definitions:
(h) "Consent" means intelligent, knowing and voluntary consent and shall not be
construed to include coerced submission.
(3) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person over the age of 11 years,
without that person's consent and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly
weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury shall be guilty
of a life felony. ...
(4) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person over the age of I 1 years,
without that person's consent, under any of the following circumstances shall be guilty of
a felony of the first degree. ...
(a) When the victim is physically helpless to resist.
(b) When the offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or
violence likely to cause serious personal injury on the victim, and the victim reasonably
belives that the offender has the present ability to execute these threats.
(c) When the offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate
against the victim, or any other person, and the victim reasonably believes that the of-
fender has the ability to execute these threats in the future. "Retaliation," as used in this
section, includes, but is not limited to, threats of future physical punishment, kidnap-
ping, false imprisonment or forcible confinement, or extortion.
(5) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person over the age of 11 years,
without that person's consent, and in the process thereof uses physical force and violence
not likely to cause serious personal injury shall be guilty of a felony of the second
degree....
159 Id. at § 794.011(1)(h).
160 Ralston v. State, 350 So. 2d 791, 792 (Fla. App. 1977).
161 See State v. Hudson, 397 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. App. 1981).
162 McIlwain v. State, 402 So. 2d 1194, 1196-97 (Fla. App. 1981).
RAPE REFORM
ual's privacy rights and sexual freedom. 163 The combination of force
and freely given consent is not logical, however, in certain situations
where the proof of force makes it clear that no freely given agreement
could possibly be given. For example, if it is proved that the defendant
severely beat the victim, it should be unnecessary to establish separately
the fact that the victim did not freely agree to the sexual penetration.
The continuing use of non-consent as an element of rape also perpetu-
ates the view that rape is distinguished from sexual intercourse primar-
ily by the victim's non-consent, rather than by the violent or coercive
nature of the assailant's behavior. 164 Thus, although the Wisconsin defi-
nition effectively eliminates the resistance standard and the use of im-
plied consent, the statute as a whole has not completely discarded all
traditional misconceptions about rape.
IV. A SUGGESTION FOR REFORM-THE STATUTORY AFFIRMATIVE
CONSENT DEFENSE
A. THE GOALS OF RAPE REFORM
Despite over twenty years of rape reform, the questions of how to
define consent and how to use it in a reform statute are still unresolved.
A variety of statutory models have been enacted throughout the coun-
try, but none of these formulations have adequately addressed all the
concerns posed by the traditional common law. In order to rectify the
misconceptions in the common law, rape reform statutes have at-
tempted to focus on force or coercion as the key element of the crime;
eliminate the use of implied consent and the resistance standard; and
punish the defendant for his culpable actions, rather than the victim for
failing to fight back.
The Model Penal Code,1 65 the New York forcible compulsion law,
and the codified resistance standards do not meet any of these goals. 166
Instead, these statutory models maintain a focus on the victim's non-
consent or resistance, and are based on the same misconceptions as the
common law. The Michigan model of force or coercion is a major im-
provement and makes the defendant's use of force or coercion the key
element of rape. The statute, however, fails to deal with the consent
issue, and so the courts are left to define when consent can be raised as
an affirmative defense and what will constitute consent. 16 7 The Wiscon-
sin statute provides the most progressive definition of consent, but the
163 See Weiner, supra note 141, at 158-61.
164 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 111-40 and accompanying text.
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law does not change the common law notion that lack of consent is the
essence of rape.168
B. THE STATUTORY AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT DEFENSE
The goals of rape reformers can be met by combining the provi-
sions of the Michigan and Wisconsin statutes. The basic definition of the
crime would be based on the Michigan model, which defines rape as
sexual penetration by force or coercion. Instead of leaving the consent
question open, however, as the Michigan statute does, the Wisconsin
definition of consent would be added. 169 This is similar to the approach
taken by the Minnesota statute, °70 although the proposed reform stat-
ute should explicitly state that consent shall be available as an affirma-
tive defense to sexual assault crimes involving adults. A clear statement
of how and when the consent issue can be raised will avoid the confusion
in the present Michigan and Minnesota statutes.
One commentator, criticizing the Michigan statute, posed the pos-
sibility of eliminating consent altogether, both as an element of the
crime and as a defense. 171 If consent is completely eliminated, a defend-
ant who exerts force or coercion to sexually penetrate another person
would be guilty, regardless of the actions of that person. Consent by the
victim could never excuse the use of force. The elimination of consent,
however, poses possible civil liberty questions. If consent cannot be
raised as a defense, then consensual sado-masochistic acts are made
criminal. In addition, in cases where coercion or threats are alleged as
opposed to physical force, there may be very little physical evidence of
the alleged coercion or threat. In those cases, the fact-finder should be
allowed to weigh the evidence concerning both the perceived threat and
the perceived consent.' 72
On one hand, a statutory consent defense will permit defendants to
allege that the victim consented to the physical force. On the other
hand, the prosecution is not burdened with a requirement of proving
non-consent at the outset in cases where it is unlikely that the victim
consented, as when the victim has been seriously injured. Use of the
Wisconsin definition eliminates the problem of implied consent 173 and
identifies a clear standard of behavior for both defendant and victim.
168 Se supra notes 142-64 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
171 BAT-rELLE INSTITUTE REPORT, FORCIBLE RAPE: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 14, at 8.
172 Wiener states: "[A] gender gap in sexual communications exists. Men and women
frequently misinterpret the intent of various dating behaviors and erotic play engaged in by
their opposite-sexed partners." Wiener, supra note 141, at 147.
173 See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
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Although the Wisconsin courts have held that under the consent defini-
tion resistance is not necessary, 174 it would be prudent to include an
explicit statutory provision to that effect in a rape reform bill. 17
5 It
would then be clearly stated that victims are under no obligation to
resist their attackers.
C. THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SEXUAL ASSAULT ACT OF 1983
On March 9, 1983, House Bill 606, the Illinois Criminal Sexual
Assault Act, was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly. 176 The
Bill is a comprehensive rape reform law, modelled in part on the Michi-
gan statute. The original draft of the Bill as introduced defined rape, or
criminal sexual assault, as "an act of sexual penetration by the use of
force or threat of force."' 77 The proposed Bill also established consent
as an affirmative defense: "If the accused raises consent as a defense
. . . it shall be an affirmative defense. . . . For the purposes of this
Section, consent means words or overt actions by a person indicating a
freely given agreement to the specific acts of sexual penetration or sexual
conduct in question." 178 The section also provided that the consent de-
fense shall not apply in cases involving minors. The Bill did not origi-
nally include a section on resistance, but it was later amended to read:
"Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim result-
ing from the use of force, threat of force, coercion or duress by the ac-
cused shall not constitute consent." 179
Affirmative defenses in Illinois are defined and governed by Section
3-2 of the Illinois Criminal Code:
(a) "Affirmative defense" means that unless the State's evidence raises the
174 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520i (Supp. 1982); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-5 (West 1982).
176 H.B. 606, 83d Ill. Gen. Ass. (1983). H.B. 606 was signed into law January 5, 1984, and
will take effect on July 1, 1984. Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault Act, P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill.
Laws -. The current Illinois rape law is based on the seventeenth century English common
law definition: "§ 11-1 Rape. (a) A male person of the age of 14 years and upwards who has
sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, by force and against her will, commits rape
.... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1981).
177 H.B. 606, 83d Ill. Gen. Ass. (1983). "Force or threat of force" was defined in the Bill, as
introduced, as:
[Tihe use of coercion, physical force or violence, or the threat of physical force or violence;
including but not limited to the following situations:
(1) when the accused makes a threat. . . and where the victim under the circumstances
reasonably believed that the accused had the ability to execute that threat immediately or in
the future; or
(2) when the accused has overcome the victim by use of superior strength or size, physi-
cal restraint, physical confinement, or an element of surprise.
178 H.B. 606, 83d Ill. Gen. Ass.
179 H.B. 606, 83d Ill. Gen. Ass., 1983 Ill. Laws -.
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issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must
present some evidence thereon.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised then the State
must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the
offense. 180
Thus, under House Bill 606, once a defendant comes forward with some
evidence of the victim's words or overt actions indicating a freely given
agreement, the consent issue is raised. The prosecution then assumes the
burden of disproving consent beyond a reasonable doubt. At no time
does the defendant assume the burden of proving the existence of con-
sent beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the legislative debate on House Bill 606, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) raised objections to the affirmative consent de-
fense. The ACLU claimed that the consent defense was an unconstitu-
tional shift in the burden of proof, in violation of the Supreme Court
decision in Mullaneg v. 4lbur.""' Non-consent, according to the ACLU,
"must be an essential element of the crime" of rape because "[w]ithout
it, there is nothing criminal about sexual intercourse between adults. 1,8 2
Non-consent is seen only as the "flip-side" of force or coercion, and the
notion that non-consent need not be shown by the prosecution "is to
suggest that in all cases of sexual assault involving no force, the only
thing necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is sexual
intercourse." 183
This position, like the traditional common law, confuses rape with
consensual sexual intercourse. 18 4 Such a position ignores the data indi-
cating that rape is primarily an act of force and violence, rather than a
sexual act.185 Current Illinois law treats force and non-consent as dis-
tinct elements, rather than the "flip-side" of one another, and requires
proof that an alleged rape occurred both by force and against the will of
the victim. Illinois courts have held that "[v]oluntary submission by a
180 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2.
181 421 U.S. 684 (1975); see Susan Bandes, Staff Counsel, ACLU, Memorandum on ACLU
Position on H.B. 606; Letter from Susan Bandes, Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties
Union of Illinois, to State Representative Aaron Jaffe, Sponsor of H.B. 606 (Mar. 14, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Letter from Susan Bandes].
182 Letter from Susan Bandes, sufbra note 181, at 2.
183 Id. at 3. The Illinois State Bar Association echoed a similar concern, stating that House
Bill 606 "would criminalize 'force' independent of any consideration of the effect of that force
upon the victim. We believe that proposal creates an unacceptably lax standard of criminal-
ity." Letter from Daniel L. Houlihan, Legislative Counsel, and Mary Lou Lowder Kent,
Director of Legislative Affairs, Illinois State Bar Association to Members of the Illinois State
Senate (Spring 1983).
184 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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female. . . no matter how reluctantly yielded, amounts to consent.' 8 6
This holding presumes that both force and consent can exist at the same
time and requires proof of both elements. Consent by the victim may
either negate or justify the evidence of force, and is analogous to an
insanity or emotional duress defense that negates evidence of the mens rea
necessary to commit a crime, or justifies the defendant's actions. Under
House Bill 606, eliminating lack of consent as an element of the crime
does not leave the act of sexual penetration as the only remaining ele-
ment. The defendant's use of force or threat of force must still be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The ACLU also neglects to consider the Supreme Court's decision
in Patterson v. New York.' 8 7 Patterson, decided in 1977, limited the
Supreme Court's holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur. 188 The Mullaney decision
struck down a Maine statute which allowed a defendant to rebut a stat-
utory presumption of "malice aforethought" in homicide cases by prov-
ing that he acted in the heat of passion. 18 9 According to one
commentator, the holding in Mullaney, carried to a logical extreme,
would have required that the prosecution assume the burden of proving
every fact affecting guilt or innocence) 9° In Patterson, the Court ex-
pressed a desire to avoid such an interpretation of Mullaney. The Court
held that states did not have to require prosecutors to "prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which [they
are] willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance
affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of punishment."' 91 The
Court recognized the states' authority to "reallocate burdens of proof by
labelling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now
defined in their statutes."' 92 Such authority, however, is constitution-
ally limited by the Due Process Clause, and states cannot, for instance,
declare individuals presumptively guilty of crimes or define essentially
innocent behavior as criminal conduct. 193
The affirmative consent defense is constitutional under the limits
identified by the Court in Patterson. Under House Bill 606, the prosecu-
tion would still be required to prove the existence of force or threat of
force. The act of forceful sexual penetration is the criminal behavior
186 People v. Rosario, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1025, 443 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1982); see also
supra note 43.
187 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
188 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
189 Id. at 685-86.
190 Comment, The Constitutionalit of Affmative Defenses After Patterson v. New York, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 655, 659 (1978).
191 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207.
192 Id. at 210.
193 Id.
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sanctioned by the Bill. 194 In addition, unlike the statute upheld in Pat-
terson, Illinois law does not require the defendant to prove the existence
of the exculpating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Once the defend-
ant shows "some evidence" of consent, the burden of refuting consent
beyond a reasonable doubt is shifted to the prosecution.1 95
Opponents of House Bill 606 also raised concerns that the affirma-
tive consent defense would violate a defendant's fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination by requiring that a defendant testify on
the consent issue.1 96 The fifth amendment prohibits compelling persons
to be witnesses against themselves.1 9 7 It does not guarantee, however,
that a defendant will be able to mount a successful, or even adequate,
defense by not testifying. The Supreme Court has held that a defend-
194 In their objections to this bill, see supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text, the ACLU
ignores the element of force or threat of force and assumes that removal of the lack of consent
as an element means that House Bill 606 criminalizes the simple act of sexual penetration
without any other showing of culpable conduct.
195 See People v. Smith, 71 111. 2d 95, 105, 374 N.E.2d 472, 476 (1978) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Illinois affirmative defense statute). Note also that a common law
affirmative defense has existed in Michigan for nearly ten years and has not yet been found
unconstitutional. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
Despite the flaws in the ACLU's analysis of the affirmative consent defense, House Bill
606 was amended by the Illinois House of Representatives in an apparent effort to allay the
concerns of the ACLU. The House amendment deleted the word "affirmative" from the
defense section of the Bill, leaving consent available as a "defense." Interview with Polly
Poskin, Executive Director, Illinois Coalition of Women Against Rape (Feb. 22, 1984). The
ACLU dropped its objections to House Bill 606 following the adoption of that amendment.
Id ; see also Lawson, Sex Crimes: Revised, 10 ILLINOIS IssuEs 6, 11 (February 1984). It is not at
all clear why changing the consent provision from an affirmative defense to a "defense" an-
swers any of the question raised by the ACLU. The procedural implications of a "defense" as
opposed to an affirmative defense are also unclear under Illinois law. See Lawson, supra, at 11
(referring to one State's Attorney's comment that "lawyers are still puzzling over what will
happen to the consent defense under the new Criminal Sexual Assault Act.")
Legislators and proponents of the new law believe that deletion of the word "affirma-
tive" should have no impact on the procedural use of the consent defense. During the final
floor debate on House Bill 606, Representative John Cullerton stated:
Under House Bill 606, the defendant may raise consent as a defense to any of the offenses
requiring proof of force or threat of force. The defendant may raise the defense by cross-
examining the complaining witness or any other witnesses, or by taking the stand himself
or herself, or by offering any other evidence. Once the defendant has presented some
evidence as to the [defense] of consent, the state sustains the burden of proving the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue as well as other elements of the
offense.
83d Ill. Gen. Ass., House of Representatives, TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 1 (Oct. 19, 1983). The
procedural process described by Representative Cullerton is identical to the process followed
for an affirmative defense. See supra text accompanying note 180.
196 Interview with Polly Poskin, Executive Director, Illinois Coalition of Women Against
Rape, and Julie Hamos, Cook County Assistant State's Attorney, two of the drafters of House
Bill 606 (Aug. 12, 1983).
197 The fifth amendment provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. ... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ant's dilemma of "demanding a choice between complete silence and
presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination." ' t98
Opponents expressed objections to the consent definition contained
in House Bill 606. The legislation as introduced contained language
borrowed from the Wisconsin statute, defining consent as "words or
overt actions. . . indicating a freely given agreement to the specific acts
of sexual penetration. . . in question." 199 The Illinois State Bar Associ-
ation criticized the definition as "practically requir[ing] a written docu-
ment before . . . engaging in sex."' 200 The Illinois Senate Judiciary
Committee staff commented that the "'specific acts' requirement seems
a bit too constraining and businesslike for your average tryst. '" 2 °i
Proponents noted that a statutory definition of consent was essen-
tial.20 2 Without one, Illinois courts were likely to rely on prior case law,
which held that a "[c]omplainant's failure to resist when it was within
her power to do so conveys the impression of consent regardless of her
mental state, [and] amounts to consent .... ",2o The Wisconsin defini-
tion used in House Bill 606 completely changes current Illinois law, and
clearly establishes that a victim's mental state is important in determin-
ing the existence of consent.
The "specific acts" requirement was included to address the prob-
lem of acquaintance rapes, where the victim and assailant may have
previously engaged in sexual intercourse. Proponents of the Bill felt that
consent to prior sexual relations should not constitute an "irrevocable"
consent to any future acts. 204 Implied consent, inferred from previous
acts or any acts short of express consent, should not be used to justify
sexual assault. Proponents however, did, agree to remove the phrase
"words or overt actions" to satisfy those critics who found the consent
definition too limiting and difficult to prove.205 As finally enacted by
198 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970); see also Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S.
837, 847 (1973) ("[t]he mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot be regarded as a
violation of his privilege against self-incrimination').
199 See supra text accompanying note 178.
200 Legislative Advisory Letter from Daniel L. Houlihan, Legislative Counsel, and Mary
Lou Lowder Kent, Director of Legislative Affairs, Illinois Bar Association, to Members of the
Senate Judiciary II Committee, at 4 (May 18, 1983).
201 Assorted Concerns Regarding House Bill 606, Staff Summary prepared for Illinois Sen-
ate Judiciary II Committee, at 9 (June, 1983).
202 Interview with Polly Poskin, Executive Director, Illinois Coalition of Women Against
Rape, and Julie Hamos, Cook County Assistant State's Attorney (Aug. 12, 1983).
203 People v. Warren, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 446 N.E.2d 591, 594 (1983); see also People v.
Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d 815, 821, 301 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1973); supra note 43.
204 Interview with Linda Miller, Legislative Director, Illinois chapter of the National Or-
ganization for Women, and Barbara Engel, Director of Women's Services, Chicago Loop
Young Women's Christian Association (Aug. 12, 1983).
205 But see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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the Illinois General Assembly, the affirmative consent defense provision
in the Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault Act reads as follows:
It shall be a defense to any offense requiring proof of force or threat of
force under [this Act] that the victim consented. "Consent" means a freely
given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in ques-
tion. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim




An affirmative consent defense meets the goals of rape reform by
placing the focus of judicial inquiry on the defendant, eliminating im-
plied consent and the resistance standard, and protecting an individual's
right to sexual privacy. Reformers hope that in cases where use of a
weapon or the infliction of serious injury seems to preclude a finding of
consensual intercourse, both prosecutors and victims will be saved the
burden and trauma of proving that a victim did not consent. In reality,
however, consent is perhaps the most frequently raised defense in rape
cases,20 7 and if the experience in Michigan is any indication, consent
will continue to be used even in the most obviously forceful cases. In
People v. Hearn,208 the defendant and victim were strangers, he used a
gun and a knife, and her story was corroborated by her boyfriend, who
was also attacked.20 9 Even under those circumstances, the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
the defendant's consent defense was reversible error. Apparently, the
defendant's testimony alone was sufficient to raise the consent issue. If
consent can be an issue in a case such as Heam, it is likely to be consid-
ered in most cases where a defendant chooses to raise it.
The affirmative consent defense is, however, a significant improve-
ment in rape reform laws. The presumption that victims consent to
forceful sexual assault is reversed, and the focus of the definition of rape
is on the force used by the defendant, rather than on the victim's lack of
consent. When consent is an issue, a victim's submission in the face of
force or coercion will not constitute consent, nor will a victim's unre-
lated actions, such as drinking, dancing, or dressing in certain clothing.
The affirmative consent defense eliminates the vestiges of a common law
206 P.A. 83-1067, ch. 38, § 12-17, 1983 Ill. Laws -.
207 Bohmer & Blumberg, supra note 41, at 393. The Bohmer and Blumberg study found
that consent was raised in 11 of 17 cases. Id.
208 100 Mich. App. 749, 300 N.W.2d 396 (1980).
209 Id. at 751-52, 300 N.W.2d at 397; see also supra note 128.
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founded on misogynist misconceptions, and codifies instead an approach
based on modern research and attitudes.
CHRISTINA M. TOHEN
